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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how the pricing strategies for base automobile models may 
differ from those for premium models, sold with extra engine power.  The pop-
ular monopoly model of market segmentation according to willingness to pay 
for  quality is compared with two models of brand rivalry.  In a  first scenario, 
consumer are fully informed of all prices;  in a  second scenario, consumers are 
initially only informed about the prices of base models, due to selective price 
advertising strategies. Implications for the differences in markups between base 
models and premium models are drawn.  These are tested with data on the 
European automobile market,  using  hedonic regression  techniques.  The evi-
dence is consistent with the brand rivalry model under limited information, and 
inconsistent with the other two models. 
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1. Introduction 
Pricing practices in the automobile market  have  become increasingly understood 
in recent  years.  Detailed econometric work on pricing in the U.S.  and European 
automobile markets is  now available, closely following  theoretical developments on 
the pricing of differentiated products.1  Most of the available evidence relates to the 
pricing practices for  the base models,  the cheapest available version of a  marketed 
model.  Almost  all  models,  however,  are nowadays offered  with a  wide variety of 
options, such as  extra engine power,  doors,  air conditioning,  air bag,  etc  ...  2  Yet, 
there has been virtually no systematic research to understand pricing practices for 
these premium models.  The present paper attempts to fill  this gap and provides a 
more systematic analysis of the differences in pricing practices between base models 
and premium models, sold with extra engine power. 
Some casual industry wisdom indicates that premium models, with extra engine 
power, are sold at much higher prices than the base models they are derived from. 
Scherer (1980), for  example, quotes an internal Ford memorandum on the Galaxie 
four-door  sedan.  The memo  reveals that the wholesale  price  of the base model 
exceeded accounting costs by 17 percent, in contrast with the much higher markups 
charged for more powerful engines, e.g.  a 293 percent markup for a V-8 engine.  In a 
review of pricing practices in the car industry, Phlips (1983, p.  204) notes that "one 
has the impression that extra options are overpriced, to extract the highest possible 
price from those who want fancy tires or extra horsepower" . 
The casual empirical evidence on the pricing of optional engine power is used in 
several textbooks as an illustration of how firms  effectively succeed in segmenting 
the market according to differences in the consumers' willingness to pay for quality.3 
A reference model in both economics and marketing is  Mussa and Rosen's (1978) 
model of market segmentation.  They show how a  monopolist can extract higher 
price-cost margins from consumers with higher willingness to pay for  quality.  This 
lFor recent econometric contributions on the pricing of automobiles,  see  Horsky and Nelson 
(1992), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995),  Goldberg (1995), Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), and 
Verb  oven (1996).  All these contibutions explicitly model automobiles as differentiated products. 
2This used to be different long time ago.  The Ford T  is  a  famous example of a  very popular 
model that came in just one variant. 
3See  Phlips (1984)  for  a  theoretical analysis following  the evidence on car pricing,  and Tirole 
(1989). 2 
can be done by offering an appropriate menu of price-quality combinations, inducing 
a self-selection of the different types of consumers. 
The monopoly market segmentation model has its limitations, however.  Although 
it predicts that absolute price cost margins rise with quality,  percentage price-cost 
margins typically decrease, for most reasonable distribution functions of consumers' 
willingness to pay for  quality.4  FUrthermore, a market segmentation strategy may 
be constrained by the presence  of competition from  other brands.  In this case, 
the self-selection constraints required to segment consumers may be dominated by 
competitive constraints, so that even absolute margins may not be increasing.  Given 
that both absolute and percentage margins are possibly much higher for  premium 
models than for  base models,  as suggested by the above industry wisdom,  a  more 
flexible theoretical framework is desirable. 
A business practice usually ignored in theoretical modelling is that of selective 
price advertising.  Advertisements typically offer detailed information on a specific 
car model, with a  description of all available options, including the various engine 
variants.  Information about the price, however, is usually limited to the base model, 
even though it would be cost  less to provide information on the prices of all other 
variants as well.  This practice may be interpreted as a means to lure customers to 
visit a nearby dealer, comparable to the phenomenon ofloss leader pricing in grocery 
stores or supermarkets. If  succesful, the practice of selective price advertising may 
be responsible for significant price and markup differences between base models and 
premium models. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  The next section provides some relevant 
background literature. In section 3 a simple theoretical framework is developed that 
is  flexible  enough to understand the pricing practices of both base and premium 
models.  Quality is  modelled as in Mussa and Rosen's monopoly model, generalized 
to allow  for  competition across  different  brands.  The model is  solved  under two 
different  scenarios:  a  first  scenario in which  consumers are fully  informed  about 
all prices before they decide which model to purchase;  a second scenario in which 
consumers are only informed about the prices of the base models, and need to visit 
the firm before they learn the prices of the premium models.  Testable implications 
about the differences  in  markups on the base models and premium models under 
4See Maskin and Riley (1984) and Tirole (1989). 3 
the two different scenarios are provided, and compared with the standard monopoly 
model.  In section 4 these testable implications are confronted with data on several 
European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom) in 1990 
and 1995.  The prices for base models are compared with the prices for  models with 
extra engine power, after adjusting for differences in cost and quality.  The empirical 
results are consistent with the brand rivalry model with limited information (second 
scenario),  and inconsistent with the full  information brand rivalry model and the 
monopoly model.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background literature 
Several models of competition between brands have emerged during the past two 
decades,  both in economics and in marketing.  These developments have coincided 
with progress in the theory of product differentiation (see Anderson, de Palma and 
Thisse (1991)  for  an overview).  Two main types of product differentiation can be 
distinguished:  horizontal and vertical.  Under horizontal product differentiation, con-
sumers are heterogeneous in that they have different  "ideal"  products and disagree 
on how to rank the actual available  products.  In  contrast,  under vertical  (qual-
ity) differentiation, all consumers rank the products in the same order, according to 
"quality", but differ in their willingness to pay for qualities. 
Brand-specific differentiation is usually viewed as horizontal product differenti-
ation.  A particularly useful model of horizontal differentiation is  the logit mode1.5 
This model, with roots in the general area of discrete choice, has the virtue of being 
tractable in both theoretical and in empirical work on brand differentiation.  The 
model has the property that consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay 
for unobservable, brand-specific attributes.  Guadagni and Little (1983)  and Ander-
son and de Palma (1992),  among others,  provide theoretical analyses of the logit 
model as a model of brand differentiation.  The number of empirical applications is 
increasing.  Applications to the automobile industry are given by Horsky and Nelson 
(1992),  Goldberg (1995)  and Verboven (1996).  The latter two applications use the 
more general nested logit model, which allows  for  different degrees of brand differ-
5The  main  other  models  of  horizontal  product  differentiation  are  Hotelling's  (1929)  loca-
tion  model,  and Dixit  and Stiglitz  (1977)  representative  consumer  model,  and the subsequent 
generalizations. 4 
entiation across classes of automobiles.  An empirical regularity that has arised is 
the higher intensity of brand rivalry in the low class and foreign segments than in 
the high class and domestic segments.  This fact will be important in the empirical 
analysis below. 
Some recent  papers have  extended the logit  model of horizontal brand differ-
entiation to vertical  (quality)  differentiation to consider the possibility of market 
segmentation. These papers are based on the monopoly model by Mussa and Rosen 
(1978).  Moorthy (1988)  extends this model to study duopoly, without allowing for 
brand differentiation.  Rhee (1996)  reconsiders Moorthy's model to allow for  brand 
differentiation in a  logit  framework.  He focuses  on strategic quality choices  and 
shows, consistent with empirical evidence, that firms may choose identical qualities 
if brands are sufficiently differentiated.  Most closely related to the present paper, 
Katz (1984) and Gilbert and Matutes (1993) consider brand-differentiated firms sell-
ing multiple products of different quality.6  Katz focuses on quality choice, assuming 
that consumer brand sensitivity and quality sensitivity are correlated.  Gilbert and 
Matutes focus on entry deterrence strategies through product proliferation. 
The focus  in the present  paper is  on understanding the pattern of price-cost 
margins for the quality variants offered by a particular firm (brand). A simple version 
of Mussa and Rosen's (1978) monopoly model illustrates the problem and introduces 
the model proposed in the next section.  Consider one firm selling one product with 
low quality vL,and op.e with high quality VH,  at marginal cost of CL  and CH.  There 
are N  consumers, each of whom obtains an indirect utility of OVj  - Pj from buying 
j  =  L, H.  The parameter 0 is  a consumer-specific taste parameter, measuring the 
marginal willingness to pay for quality. It  is distributed uniformly on [fl., OJ.  Normalize 
such that 7J - fl. =  N. Consumers for whom 0 < 0*  prefer the low quality; consumers 
for  whom 0 > 0*  prefer the high quality, where 0*  = (PH  - PL)/(VH - VL)  defines 
the indifferent consumer's taste parameter.  Assuming all consumers buy one of the 
two quality variants in equilibrium, market demand is  given by qL  = (0*  - fl.)  and 
qH  =  (7J - 0*).  Profits are (PL - CL)qL +  (PH - CH )qH.  The optimal high quality price 
PH  can be found from the first-order condition with respect to PH: 
(2.1) 
6 They capture brand-differentiation in a location framework, rather than in a logit discrete-choice 
framework. 5 
The optimal quality price PL  is  the highest price, such that the consumer with 
the lowest  marginal willingness to pay for  quality is  still willing to buy,  i.e.  PL  = 
~VL. It is  straightforward to verify that the absolute price-cost margin of the high 
quality product, PH  - CH,  is  greater than the price-cost margin of the low  quality 
product, PL  - CL.  However,  the percentage price-cost margin of the high quality 
product (PH-CH)/PH is less than the percentage price-cost margin of the low quality 
product (PL  - cd/PL.  This can be verified from  appropriate substitutions, using 
the constraints that market demand of the low quality product cannot be negative, 
and the equilibrium assumption that all  consumers buy one of the two  variants. 
These findings easily generalize to the case in which not all consumers would buy 
a  product in equilibrium,  and to a  whole set of reasonable distribution functions 
(Tirole, 1988).  In sum, the monopoly model is flexible enough to explain increasing 
absolute markups, but it does not explain the possibility of increasing percentage 
markups (unless strong distributional assumptions are made). Problems become even 
more severe once competition between brands is  introduced.  Competition further 
constrains the firms' capability to charge increasing price-cost margins. 
To explain the possibility of increasing percentage markups, the nature of brand 
competition is reconsidered and made more realistic.  We take the view that, in the 
automobile market, brand competition is not only affected by consumer heterogene-
ity in the valuation of unobservable brand-specific attributes; imperfect information 
about prices also plays a crucial role.  Generally speaking, consumers are better in-
formed about the prices of the base models than about the prices of premium models. 
This imperfect information is in fact encouraged by the automobile manufacturers. 
They heavily advertize the characteristics of their brands, describe in detail the vari-
ety of options offered, but provide information about the price of the base model only. 
As a result, when comparing different brands, consumers usually have a good idea 
about the base model prices; they need to incur extra search costs to learn about the 
prices of premium models.  The idea of consumer search costs, reflecting imperfect 
information about prices, is  not new.  Diamond (1971)  showed that the equilibrium 
prices of otherwise homogeneous goods are the monopoly prices, if consumers need to 
incur an arbitrarily small search cost to learn each price.  The intuition for this result 
is based on the consumers' rational expectations about the equilibrium.  When they 
visit a firm and observe a monopoly price, they are not willing to pay an additional 6 
search cost since they expect other firms to charge the same prices in equilibrium.  Lal 
and Matutes (1993) use a search cost model to explain loss-leader pricing, a common 
strategy in retailing, in which firms selectively advertize the price of some grocery 
items to lure consumers to the store and induce them to buy other items as well. 7 
They assume that the demands for  different grocery items are independent.  In our 
model,  the demands for  base models and premium models will  be interdependent: 
as the price for a base model decreases, consumers also expect a lower price for the 
premium model.  8 
The model developed and analyzed in the next section, considers two alternative 
scenarios,  one in which consumers are fully  informed about all  prices,  another in 
which they are informed only about the prices of the base models before they visit a 
firm.  The model is admittedly simple.  For example, it would have been more realistic 
to "nest" the two scenario's into one model by assuming a proportion A of uninformed 
consumers, and a proportion 1-A of informed consumers, who may visit several firms 
at no cost, as in Salop and Stiglitz (1977).  The analysis also abstracts from issues 
such as the choices which qualities to offer and which qualities to advertize.  Instead, 
it focuses on explaining the pattern of markups across different variants of the same 
brand, given a realistic description of observed quality and advertizing choices in the 
automobile industry. 
3. The model 
Consider the following  stylized  model of competition in the automobile industry. 
There are two firms,  1 and 2,  each selling one specific brand.  Each firm i  offers its 
brand in two different variants, a base model with a low quality VL and a premium 
model with a high quality VH.  Firm i sells its base model at a price PiL, its premium 
model at a  price PiH.  Marginal costs  are  CL  and CH,  respectively.  There are N 
consumers,  all endowed with income I, purchasing one of the goods.  A consumer 
obtains the following indirect utility from variants Land H  of the brand sold by firm 
i  =  1,2. 
(3.1) 
7See Hess and Gerstner (1987) for an early analysis of loss leader pricing. 
8See Semester (1995) for a different mechanism in which firms can signal a  price image through 
advertising. 7 
(3.2) 
where Band Ci are random variables, capturing consumer heterogeneity in the will-
ingness to pay for  quality and in brand preference.  First, consumers may differ in 
their marginal willingness to pay for  quality,  B.  Assume B is  uniformely distributed 
across consumers on the interval [.e,Bj.  Intuitively, if the difference between Band.e 
is large, then consumers differ much in their willingness to pay for  quality; if 7J =  .e, 
then all consumers have the same willingness  to pay for  quality.  Without loss  of 
generality,  let 7J - fl.  =  N.  With this normalization,  demands and market shares 
will coincide.  Second, consumers may differ in their brand preference.  Each brand 
contains numerous attributes, such as style, image or comfort, which consumers may 
evaluate differently.  The random variable Ci denotes a consumer's willingness to pay 
for  a specific brand i:  it enters the indirect utility of both the base model and the 
premium model of brand i.  Assume, as in the popular logit model, that Cl  and C2 
are distributed identically and indepentently according to the type I extreme value 
distribution, with a mean zero and standard deviation 7ralV"3.9 If a = 0, then there 
is no heterogeneity in brand-specific preferences;  brand 1 and 2 are essentially ho-
mogeneous goods.  As  a  increases,  consumers become heterogeneous in that they 
are more likely to value the two brands differently.  The parameter a will be impor-
tant in what follows.  It allows to capture the degree of competition stemming from 
heterogeneity in brand preference. 
Two alternative scenarios are considered.  In the first  scenario,  consumers are 
fully informed about all prices before they visit a firm and choose a variant.  This 
scenario is  likely to be applicable if firms heavily advertise the prices of all variants 
they sell, and if, in addition, consumers have good computational skills in that they 
face  no problems in comparing the prices of all brands and variants.  In the second 
scenario,  consumers  are only  informed  about  the prices  of the base  models.  To 
learn the prices  of the premium models  they need  to engage  in costly  "search". 
One interpretation of this costly search is that firms only advertize the prices of the 
base models;  consumers need to visit the firm,  at a cost, to learn the prices of the 
premium models.  Another,  complementary interpretation is  that consumers have 
limited computational skills.  They use the base model prices as reference prices to 
9See e.g.  Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for details on the logit model. 8 
choose among different brands, and only form vague expectations on the prices for 
the premium models.  Both interpretations yield  a  positive consumer search cost 
s > O.  The consideration of two alternative scenarios is for expositional convenience. 
It would be more realistic to the integrate the two scenario's into one model,  for 
example by assuming that a  proportion .A  of consumers is  perfectly informed, and 
a  proportion 1 - .A  is  only partially informed.  This, however,  would considerably 
complicate the analysis without generating new insights.  The alternative scenario's 
are now described in more detail. 
Scenario 1. Full information about prices 
In stage 1, firms simultaneously announce to consumers which price they charge 
for the both base model and the premium model.  In stage 2, consumers choose which 
firm to visit and which variant to buy at that firm,  based on the prices announced 
in stage l. 
Scenario 2.  Limited information about prices 
In stage lA, both firms simultaneously announce to consumers which price they 
charge for  the base model.  In stage 1B, consumers form expectations of the prices 
charged for  the premium models  and firms  set the actual prices  of the premium 
models.  In stage 2,  consumers choose which firm to visit, based on the announced 
base model prices and the expected premium model prices.  They learn the actual 
price of the premium model at the firm they visit, and decide whether to buy one 
of the two variants and, if so,  which one.  If they choose not to buy either of the 
variants, they can visit the rival firm in stage 3 at a search cost s > O.  Upon visting 
the rival firm in stage 3, the consumer learns all prices, and is  free to choose which 
variant to buy from which firm. 
In both scenarios, each firm chooses prices to maximize profits, given the prices 
set simultaneously by the rival firm,  and in anticipation of the equilibrium decisions 
taken by firms and consumers in the following stages of the game.  Similarly, in both 
scenarios consumers choose which firm to visit and which variant to buy to maximize 
(expected)  indirect utility, as given by 3.1  and 3.2.  In scenario 2,  consumers need 
to form expectations about the prices of the unannounced premium models.  I  will 
require these expectations to be rational,  i.e.  consistent with the assumptions of 
the model.  Consumers use  their knowledge  of the game,  including the fact  that 9 
firms choose prices to maximize profits, to forecast how the unannounced premium 
model prices depend on the announced base model prices.  Of course, in equilibrium 
these forecasts are correct, and firms do not "surprise" consumers.  Consequently, in 
scenario 2,  consumers always buy one of the variants from the store they visited in 
stage 2;  no consumer is surprised and finds it necessary to incur the positive search 
cost s to visit the other firm in stage 3. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Aggregate demands 
First consider, for both scenario's, the consumers' decision in stage 2:  which firm to 
visit and which variant to buy, given the observed and expected prices.  This amounts 
to deriving the aggregate demand function for each of the four brand/variants. Let 
P~L and P~H be the expected price of the base model and premium model sold by 
firm i.  Obviously, for  an announced price (Le.  all prices under scenario 1, and the 
base model prices under scenario 2),  we  have  P~L = PiL  and P~H = PiH.  For an 
unannounced price of the premium model, we have P~H = P~H(piL)' where P~H(.) is 
a function to be derived later, reflecting the dependence of expected premium model 
prices on the observed base model prices. 
The consumer's decision can be broken down in two parts. First, for each brand, 
the consumer decides which variant of that brand is preferred.  This decision crucially 
depends on the marginal willingness to pay for  quality O.  From comparing 3.1 and 
3.2 it is obvious that consumers with a relatively low marginal willingness to pay for 
quality, 0 < 0:, prefer the base model variant of brand i; consumers with 0 > 0: prefer 
the premium model, where 0:  is  the indifferent consumer's marginal willingness to 
pay for quality, i.e. 
e  e 
0* = PiH - PiL 
t  -
VH -VL 
Second, the consumer compares the preferred variants of the two different brands. 
Table 1 summarizes which comparisons the consumers make. 
For example, if 0i  < O2, then a consumer with 0 E  [Oi, 02J  prefers the premium 
model of brand 1 to the base model, and prefers the base model of brand 2 to the 
premium model, so that he compares brand 1's premium model with brand 2's base 10 
model.  The outcomes of the cross-brand comparisons are probabilistic and depend on 
the extreme value distributed random variables 101  and 102,  measuring heterogeneity 
in brand preference. The probability that a consumer, with quality taste parameter 
e,  prefers brand 1 with variant j, j  = L,H, over brand 2 with variant k,  k = L,H, 
is given by the standard logit formula: 
Note that Pr(u2k(e)  ~  U1j(e)) = 1-Pr(u1j(e)  ~  U2k(e)).  Given that the quality 
taste parameter e  is uniformly distibuted on [~, OJ,  the aggregate demand for the base 
model of brand 1 is given by: 
0  for  e*  < e  1  - ti  exp(-pl'r./a )  de  for  ~:::; ei < e2 
q1L  = 
fl..  exp(  -ph/a)+exp(  -ph/a)  (4.1)  t2  exp( -phJ  a)  de 
fl..  exp(  -ph/a)+exp(  -p'2da)  +  ti  exp(  -Pi' cJ a)  de 
92 exp(  -ph/a)+exp(9(vH-VL)-P'2H/a)  for  e2  :::; ei < B. 
Intuitively, there are three cases to consider, depending on the value of ei· If  ph 
is  very high so that ei  < ~, then any consumer prefers the premium model to the 
base model of brand 1,  and demand q1L  is zero.  If ph is moderately high so that 
~ :::;  ei  < e2, then all consumers for  which e E  [~, eil,  compare the base model of 
brand 1 with the base model of brand 2.  Integrating the relevant choice probabilities 
over the range  [~, eil,  then yields the aggregate demand formula for  case 2.  (Note 
that the terms ev  L  cancel in the formula for case 2.) If  ph is low so that e2  :::; ei < B, 
then all consumers for  whom e E  [~, e2 1,  compare the base model of brand 1 with 
the base model of brand 2,  and all consumers for  whom e E  [e2,  eiJ,  compare the 
base model of brand 1 with the premium model of brand 2.  Integrating the relevant 
choice probabilities over the two ranges  [~, e2 1  and [e2,  eil  then yields the aggregate 
demand formula for  case 3.  A  similar reasoning yields  aggregate demand for  the 
premium model of brand 1, depending on the level of ei: 11 
for  7J < tJi 
for  tJ2  ~  tJi  < 7J 
(4.2) 
The demand function  for  the base and premium models  of brand 2,  q2L  and 
q2H,  can be analogously derived.  In the Appendix, it is explained how to obtain a 
closed-form solution for the demand functions. 
4.2. Pricing decisions 
Firms set prices to maximize profits, as given by 
for each firm i. Consider first the pricing decisions in scenario 1.  As explained above, 
all price decisions are taken in stage 1, simultaneously by both firms, in anticipation 
of consumer choices in stage 2.  Consumer choices have been derived in the previous 
subsection, and are summarized by the demand functions 4.1  and 4.2.  Because all 
prices are announced in scenario 1, one can replace the expected prices P~L and  P~H in 
the demand functions by the actual prices PiL  and PiH.  Firm l's first-order condition 
for profit maximization, with respect to PIL  and P2H,  are given by: 
(PiL  - CL) ~~~~ + qIL + (PiH  - CH) ~~~~  0 
(PiL  - CL) gZ;t + (PiH  - CH)  ~~~~ + qIH  0 
and similarly for  firm  2.  Given the symmetry in the model,  focus  on finding  a 
symmetric equilibrium, PIL = P2L = PL  and PIH = P2H = PH.  Proving the existence 
of an equilibrium is  beyond the scope of the present  paper.  Although there are 
good reasons to expect that an equilibrium does indeed exist  10 , simply assume here 
that this is  the case.  The demand derivatives, after imposing symmetry, are easily 
laThe assumption of Caplin and Nalebuff's (1991)  model are satisfied, so an equilibrium would 
exist if there would be four single-product firms,  each selling one of the brand/variants.  Proving 
existence with multiproduct firms is more difficult, though it has been shown in a variety of models 
that have some of the features of the present model, see e.g.  Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1991). 
A direct proof consists of showing that the profit functions are quasi-concave in the present model. 12 
computed; they are presented in the Appendix.  They allow to write the first-order 
conditions as: 
(PL  - cL)(8* - fl.)  =  20-(28*  - fl. - ~Z=~~) 
(PH  - CH )(0 - 8*)  =  20-(e - 28* + ~Z=~~) 
where 8*  ==  (PH  - PL)/(VH - VL).  We have: 
°  0, 
(4.3) 
Proposition 1.  When there is full information about prices (scenario 1), a  unique 




Proof: It is straightforward to verify that 4.4 satisfies the first-order conditions. 
Since 4.3  can be reduced to one cubic in PL  and another in PH,  there remain two 
other solutions to consider.  Factoring out the solution 4.4, leaves a quadratic, from 
which the remaining solutions can be computed.  It can be verified that there are 
two real solutions for the prices.  However, they are inconsistent with the model since 
they either yield negative demand for the base models, or negative demands for the 
premium models. 
Proposition 1 implies that firms  charge the same absolute markup for  the base 
model as for the premium model, i.e.  20-.  This is in stark contrast with the monopoly 
model, which predicts that markups that are increasing in quality.  Somewhat surpis-
ingly, with brand rivalry firms are not able to segment consumers according to their 
willingness to pay for  quality 8 for any level of competition, i.e.  for  any degree of 
heterogeneity in brand preference. 
Consider next the pricing decisions in scenario 2.  As explained above,  pricing 
decisions are taken and announced to consumers in stage 1A about the base models 
only, so that one can set PiL = PiL  in the demand functions.  The pricing decisions 
for  the premium models are taken in stage 1B, simultaneous with the formation of 
consumer expectations about these prices.  With rational expectations, consumer 
forecasts are correct and firms do not surprise consumers in stage lB. I claim that 
the expected and the actual price of the premium model,  PiH  and PiH,  as formed 
in stage 1B, equal the monopoly price, i.e.  the price that firm  i  would set for  the 13 
premium model in the absence of any competition from its rival, given the price it 
already chose for the base model.  Formally, 
e  m  _  CH-CL  -VH-VL 
PiH = PiH = PiH = PiL +  2  + e  2  '  (4.5) 
as is obvious from the discussion of the monopoly model and 2.1 in section 2.  Note 
that,  as  consumers  observe  a  lower  price  for  the base  model PiL,  they expect  a 
lower  price for  the premium model as well.  In this sense,  base model prices signal 
expected premium model prices.ll The proof of why firms (are expected to) charge 
the monopoly price follows  a  similar reasoning as in Diamond  (1971)  or Lal and 
Matutes (1994).  For a  candidate equilibrium price below this monopoly price, say 
P~H each firm has an incentive to deviate and surprise the consumers that visited 
the firm,  by setting a  slightly higher price, i.e.  P~H + E  ,  with E  sufficiently small 
so  that E < s.  Under this surprise price, no consumer finds it worthwhile to visit 
the rival firm where they expect to pay the candidate equilibrium price p}W  Hence, 
from slightly increasing the price of its premium model,  the firm  would loose no 
market share to its rival and would come closer to its preferred monopoly.  Only at 
the first-best monopoly price, given the price of the base model, set in stage lA, do 
firms  have no incentive to raise their price.  Similarly,  and obviously,  firms  do not 
have an incentive to lower their price of the premium level below the monopoly price: 
this is a happy surprise to consumers who visited the firm, but it fails to attract the 
ignorant consumers who visited the rival. 
From 4.5, it immediately follows that firms segment consumers according to will-
ingness to pay for quality.  Higher absolute markups are charged to consumers with a 
high willingness to pay for quality, exactly as in the monopoly model, see Table 2.  To 
investigate whether firms also have incentives to charge higher percentage markups 
to quality sensitive consumers, it is necessary to derive the actual equilibrium prices 
for the base models, which firms set and announce simultaneously in stage 1A. 
Firm 1  's first-order condition for  profit maximization with respect to PIL, given 
aggregate demands after substituting the expected prices, specifically 4.5, is: 
aqlL  aqlH  dPIH 
(PlL -q)-a  +qlL + (PlH -CH)-a + -d-q1H. 
PIL  PIL  PIL 
(4.6) 
llThis contrast with Lal and Matutes (1994).  See Simester (1995)  for  an interesting different 
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Note that this first-order condition is distinct from firm 1  's first-order condition 
with respect to PIL in two respects.  First, the partial demand derivatives 8qlL/8PlL 
and 8qlH  /8PlL differ, because a unit reduction in PIL in stage 1A will yield the same 
unit reduction in PIH in stage 1B, as can be seen from 4.5.  The exact demand deriva-
tives are computed in the Appendix. Second, the last term is new; its interpretation 
is analogous to the interpretation of the second term. A small reduction in the price 
PIL implies a  "traditional"  loss on the sales of the base model,  a loss  of -qlL; in 
addition, however, it implies that firm 1 will lower the price of the premium model in 
stage 1B, by dplH/dplL which equals 1, see 4.5, implying an additional loss on the 
sales of the premium model of -qlH. A similar first-order condition holds for firm 2. 
Again focus on finding a symmetric equilibrium.  A unique symmetric equilibrium is 
found from solving and simplifying the linear system 4.5 and 4.6.  This immediately 
yields: 
Proposition 2.  When information about prices is limited to the base model prices 
(scenario 2),  the unique equilibrium is given by 
This may be compared to the equilibrum with full information about prices.  The 
absolute markup on the base model is  lower when there is  limited information than 
when there is full information; the absolute markup on the premium model is higher 
when there is  limited information than when there is  full  information.  Intuitively, 
firms  compete vigourosly for consumers through the prices of the base models,  in 
anticipation of the large monopoly profits to be earned from the premium models. 
Overall  profits,  however,  are the same,  equalling  a{(j - fl)  in both scenarios.  In 
the extreme case in which there is no heterogeneity in brand preferences, profits are 
zero, with negative base model profits exactly compensating positive premium model 
profits. 
Table 2 compares the percentage markups of the base and premium models, in 
the monopoly case and the cases of brand rivalry with full and imperfect information 
about prices.  In the monopoly case, percentage markups of premium models are less 
than percentage markups of base models.  The same is  true if there is  brand rivalry 
with full price information. However, the difference in percentage markups becomes 15 
very small as  CT  approaches infinity.  In the case of brand rivalry with limited price 
information, the pattern of percentage markups is fundamentally different.  For small 
degrees of brand heterogeneity, and correspondingly vigourous competition (CT  < CT*), 
the percentage markup may be significantly smaller for the base model than for the 
premium model.  This is  obvious  for  the extreme case  in which  CT  =  0,  so  that 
markups are negative for the base model and positive for the premium model.  Only 
for significant brand heterogeneity, and correspondingly soft competition (CT  > CT*), 
is  the percentage markup for  the base model larger than for  the premium model, 
although this difference becomes very small as CT  approaches infinity. 
5.  Empirical Results 
The theoretical framework developed in the previous sections is  now applied to the 
pricing of optional engine power on automobiles.  Hedonic regressions are estimated 
to investigate systematic differences in pricing behavior on base models and premium 
models. 
The automobile industry is  well-suited for  our purposes.  There is detailed em-
pirical evidence on the intensity of brand rivalry in the automobile market, and on 
differences in this intensity across different market segments.  This is important, since 
the intensity of brand rivalry, as captured by the heterogeneity parameter CT,  is cru-
cial in distinguishing between alternative theories of pricing (recall Table 2).  Several 
industry and marketing studies classify the automobile industry in various segments, 
according to two criteria: class and country of origin. The classes are defined accord-
ing to common characteristics of the cars, such as size and performance.  Commonly 
used class labels are:  subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard, luxury, sports 
and utility.  Country of origin is  believed to be important, since cars from the same 
country of origin are perceived as similar by consumers and are normally subject to 
the same type of trade restrictions. 
Consistent with industry wisdom, econometric studies suggest the following about 
the intensity of brand rivalry in different  segments.  First,  brand rivalry is  very 
intense in the low class segments of the market, such as  the subcompacts and the 
compacts.  In the higher class segments, brand rivalry tends to be softer, especially 
in the standard, luxury and sports segments.  One explanation comes directly from 
the theoretical model  developed  above:  consumers are relatively homogeneous  in 16 
their preferences  for  low  class  models  (low  (J').  For  high class  models  they tend 
to disagree  more about which  brand,  e.g.  BMW or Mercedes,  they prefer  (high 
(J').  An alternative explanation for  the differences in brand rivalry is  not explicitly 
captured in the simple theoretical framework,  but would yield similar conclusions: 
the number of competing brands tends to be higher in the low class segments than 
in the high class  segments.  Second,  brand rivalry is  more intense in the foreign 
segments than in the domestic segments.  This can again be explained by two factors: 
foreign brands are perceived as  more similar and there are many more competing 
foreign  brands than domestic  brands.  Econometric evidence on these findings  is 
provided, among others, by Bresnahan (1981),  Mertens and Ginsburgh (1985)  and 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).  Most closely related to the theoretical framework 
of this paper, are the studies by Horsky and Nelson  (1992),  Goldberg (1995)  and 
Verboven (1996).  Goldberg and Verboven use a nested logit model of brand rivalry, 
allowing for  different intensities of brand rivalry in different segments, and obtain 
similar findings on the intensity of rivalry in different segments. 
A base model is defined as the cheapest available variant of a model.  As premium 
models I  consider models  that come with extra engine power.  I  do  not consider 
pricing of other options, such as extra number of doors or air bag, for several reasons. 
First, a comparison between the base model prices and the prices of other premium 
models, such as extra number of doors, does not easily allow to control directly for 
differences in quality, since the number of doors in the base models are usually the 
same (or does not vary by much).  In contrast, horsepower and displacement, which 
determine engine power, vary a lot across different base models, so that it is possible 
to obtain an estimate of the effect of engine power on price, and control for this when 
examining the prices of premium models with extra engine power.  Second, options 
other than extra engine power, are often offered for free in special sales promotions. 
Such practices require further theoretical work,  related to the literature on price 
promotions, and more detailed data. 
Consider a general reduced form expression for the price of a brand/variant i: 
where Ci(Vi)  is  the marginal cost of i  as a  function of quality Vi,  and mi(v) is  the 
reduced form solution for  the percentage markup as a  function of the vector of v, 17 
containing all competing brand/variants' qualities.  Note that quality Vi enters both 
marginal cost and markup in  (14),  so  that special care must be taken to distin-
guish high prices due to high marginal costs from high prices due to high markups. 
In particular, it will  not be possible to estimate the exact markups in the above 
reduced-form framework; it will, however, be possible to say something about differ-
ences in markups between base and premium models under reasonable identification 
assumptions.  Expression  (14)  can be approximated by In(Pi)  c::::  lnc(vi) + mi(v). 
Estimate this by the following hedonic regression: 
Xi'"'( +  am + af +  a g +  ah 
+  tig + tih + Ci· 
The first row contains elements interpreted to influence both marginal costs and 
markups. The vector Xi contains the physical characteristics of brand/variant i, such 
as horsepower, displacement, turbo, injection, weight and size.  The fixed effects am 
and af are,  respectively,  market-specific and firm-specific  effects,  estimated using 
dummy variables. Five markets are considered:  Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom.  Prices may be high, say in the U.K., because of high marginal 
costs of selling or because of high markups in that country.12  The following firms are 
considered: Fiat, Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault and Volkswagen.  Once again, prices of 
one firm may be high because of high marginal costs or because of high markups. The 
class-specific effects ag  may capture unobserved characteristics influencing marginal 
cost, common to all firms in a class.  Yet,  given the detailed econometric evidence 
from the structural model estimates referred to above, it is reasonable to expect that 
they capture class-specific markups to a significant extent.  Similarly, the country-
of-origin-specific  effects  ah  (domestic versus foreign)  may capture lower  marginal 
costs to domestic firms  (e.g.  because of transportation costs or trade restrictions). 
Yet again, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of these effects to different 
markups, given the structural econometric evidence on differences in market power 
between domestic and foreign firms.13 
The fixed  effects tig  and tih  are  interpreted  to capture the extra percentage 
12In a structural model, Verb  oven (1996) distinguishes between these two possibilities. 
13 Japanese brands were excluded from the sample to avoid the problem of how to deal with the 
quota constraints which influence markups.  This is  already difficult enough in structural models, 
see Goldberg (1995) and Verb  oven (1996). 18 
markup  (possibly negative)  charged  on  a  premium model from  class  9  and from 
country of origin h, respectively.  Crucially, I allow the extra markup charged on the 
premium model to be different across classes and country of origins, in accordance 
with the theoretical framework which  predicts different  extra markups depending 
on the intensity of brand rivalry in a given segment (Table 2).  It is  reasonable to 
assume that ag  and ah  do not reflect an extra marginal cost in producing the pre-
mium model.  The premium models only differ from the base models in that they 
contain extra engine power, and this is already carefully controlled for by the physi-
cal characteristics horsepower, displacement, turbo and injection.  In this respect, it 
is especially important to note that I controlled for turbo and injection, which may 
significantly influence marginal costs of premium models.  Indeed,  typically,  base 
models tend to come without turbo and injection, whereas several premium models 
are equipped with one or both of these features.  Therefore, if turbo and injection had 
been excluded, the estimates of ag  and ah could take over their effects on marginal 
cost. 
The empirical results from the hedonic regression are presented in Table 3.  To 
check for the robustness of the results the regression was applied to a set of brand 
variants in both 1990 and 1995, yielding a total number of brand/variant observations 
of 1256.  Although not all parameter estimates were stable over the two periods, the 
parameters of main interest, measuring the extra markups on premium models, are 
stable.  I therefore present the results for  a pooled regression, allowing unrestricted 
estimation of the significantly unstable parameters.  Most parameter estimates are 
intuitive.  The parameter estimates of the physical characteristics have the expected 
sign and they are significant, except for the insignificant estimates of the weight and 
injection parameters.  The estimates of market- and firm-specific  fixed  effects  are 
consistent with other studies.  They are not stable over the two  periods; the main 
reason for  this are the large fluctuations of exchange rates between 1990 and 1995. 
The estimates of the class-specific effects  are consistent with industry wisdom 
and previous econometric evidence on the car market.  Relative to the subcompact 
class, the compact class is 15 percent more expensive, after controlling for differences 
in characteristics.  Similarly,  the intermediate,  standard and luxary segments are 
between 23  and 36 percent more expensive.  Although this may come in part from 
class-specific costs,  it is  reasonable to attribute a  significant  part to class-specific 19 
markups. The domestic fixed effect is significantly positive.  Domestic brand/variants 
are about 4 percent more expensive than foreign brands.  Given that domestic firms 
are likely to have a marginal cost advantage over foreign firms  (of up to 10  percent 
in Verboven's (1996)  structural estimates), one may expect that actual markups on 
domestic models are even more than 4 percent larger. 
It is  now  possible  to turn to  an interpretation of the estimates of the extra 
markups charged for the premium models.  The estimates reveal that premium mod-
els are priced significantly higher than base models in the low, subcompact class and 
in the foreign segment. A premium model of a domestically produced subcompact car 
is 8 percent more expensive than the base model, after controlling for  differences in 
engine power; a premium model of a foreign subcompact car is even 11 percent (8+3 
percent) more expensive.  In sharp contrast, premium models of the other, higher 
classes are sold at percentage discounts, though not significantly different from zero. 
Without a theoretical framework these contrasting results can only be explained 
with some  ad hoc reasoning.  But using the theoretical findings  from  the previous 
sections, summarized in Table 2, these results can be interpreted as being consistent 
with the model of brand rivalry under imperfect information (scenario 2),  and as 
inconsistent with both the monopoly model and the model of brand rivalry with 
full  information  (scenario  1).  When consumers  are not well  informed  about the 
prices of premium models,  they base their brand choices initially on the prices of 
the base models.  This gives firms  an incentive to convince consumers to purchase 
their brand by charging low (sometimes below cost) prices for  base models of their 
brand. Once consumers have been attracted to their particular brand, market power 
results and firms can charge high monopolistic prices for the premium models.  This 
results in large percentage markup differences between base and premium models if 
brand rivalry is  intense.  In contrast, if brand rivalry is  not so  intense, equilibrium 
markups on the base models may be fairly large, so that the extra percentage markup 
charged for premium models can be small or negative. It is precisely in the segments 
in which brand rivalry is  most intense  (subcompact  and foreign)  that percentage 
markups for  premium models are significantly higher.  This evidence thus suggests 
that the model of brand rivalry with limited information on the prices of premium 
models (scenario 2)  is a good description of competition in the automobile industry. 
The widely observed selective advertizing strategies, providing information solely on 20 
the base model prices, possibly in combination with limited consumer computational 
skills, may thus be interpreted as important determinants of the pattern of markups 
in the automobile market. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has compared pricing practices on base and premium models, with extra 
engine power, in the automobile industry. Various alternative models, with alterna-
tive predictions about the pattern of markups, have been considered:  a  monopoly 
model, a model of brand rivalry with full consumer information and a model of rivalry 
in which consumers are only well informed about base model prices.  The empirical 
results, from hedonic regression estimates, provide evidence in favor  of the limited 
information model. 
This paper only begins to improve our understanding of the differential pricing 
practices between base model and premium models. The theoretical framework, with 
brand differentiation and imperfect information, captures, I believe, the essential fea-
tures of the pricing behavior for  automobiles.  Nevertheless, it is  worth making the 
model more realistic and estimate a structural model of pricing.  For this, it is  nec-
essary to extend the model to more than two firms,  with differing marginal costs 
and qualities,  in a  nested rather than simple logit framework.  Scenario's 1 and 2 
could be combined in one model by assuming a proportion of fully informed, and an-
other proportion of limitedly informed consumers.  Such a model could be estimated 
structurally, with data on sales of the various brands and variants in addition to the 
data used above.  Needless to say, such an approach could be computationally rather 
intractable. 
From a theoretical perspective, it would be interesting to analyze firms' decisions 
prior to the pricing stage in the present model.  Two scenario's have been considered, 
one in which firms  advertize all prices,  another in which they advertize only base 
model prices.  It would be interesting· to investigate the equilibrium incentives for 
firms to advertize, under alternative intensities of brand rivalry.  Applications would 
extend well beyond the automobile case.  Similarly, it would be interesting to analyze 
the firms' quality choices in the developed framework. 21 
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8. Appendix 
The demand equations (4.1.)  and (4.2.)  can easily be solved in closed form, noting 
that Ide =  e and 23 
/
.  a  1 
b  (lI)dll=II--ln(a+bexp(cll)). 
.  a +  exp c  c 




8qlL  _  8qlH 
8PIH  - 8PIL 
8qlH 
8PIH 
_l(lI* - II)  - ! 
40- - 2(VH-VL) 
1 
Similarly, the demand derivatives in scenario 2 are, after substituting (4.5)  into 
(4.2): 
8qlL  _l( CH-c['  + ~ - II) 
8PlL  40- 2(VH-vd  2  -
8q1H  _l(~  _  CH-CL  ) 
8PlL  40- 2  2(VH-VL)' 
9.  Tables 
Table l. Consumer comparisons of variants across brands 
IIi < 112  IIi> 112 
if II  E  [fl., IIi],  compare 1L with 2L  if II  E  [fl., II:;!],  compare 1L with 2L 
if II  E [IIi, II:;!],  compare 1H with 2L  if II E  [11:;!,Oi],  compare 1L with 2H 
if II  E  [02,  OJ,  compare IH with 2H  if 0 E [ei, OJ,  compare 1H with 2H 
Table 2.  Difference in markups on premium and base model 
monopoly  duopoly (scenario 1)  duopoly (scenario 2) 
absolute markups  +  0  + 
(PH - CH)  - (PL  - CL)  difference independent of (J" 
percentage markups  + for  (J" < (J"* 
l!.H.::::E.H..  _  P.L..::::.E.L.  o  for  (J"  =  0  o  for  (J"  =  (J"* 
PH  PL 
- - for  (J"  > 0  - for  (J"  > (J"* 
--t 0 as  (J"  --t 00  --t 0 as  (J"  --t 00 
(J"*  - _1_  VH-VL  (!Z.  _  Cfr-CL  )  (c  (!Z.  _  CH-CL  )  +  C  (!Z. +  Cfr-CL  _~))  - e-o 2~CH-CL)  2  2(VH-VL)  H  2  2(VH-vd  L  2  2(VH-VL)  -24 
Table 3.  Hedonic Regression, unstable specification, 1256 observations 
1990 estimates  significant 1995 differences 
variable  parameter  stand. error  parameter  stand.  error 
constant  7.405  .171  .218  .016 
characteristics  displacement  .133  .017 
horsepower  .552  .019 
turbo  .051  .016 
injection  .008  .010 
weight  .115  .502 
width  .119  .029 
market-specific  France  .045  .012  .008  .017 
effects (am),  Germany  .090  .013  -.044  .018 
relative to  Italy  .151  .012  -.251  .018 
Belgium  U.K.  .218  .012  -.266  .018 
firm-specific  Ford  .020  .012  .072  .015 
effects (a f)  ,  GM  -.013  .013  .045  .018 
relative to  Peugeot  .020  .012  .072  .015 
Fiat  Renault  .015  .015  .062  .019 
Volkswagen  .075  .015  -.003  .020 
class  compact  .150  .020 
effects (ag),  intermediate  .227  .024 
relative to  standard  .306  .035 
subcompacts  luxary  .360  .040 
dom.  effect (ah)  domestic  .040  .014 
premium effects  subcompact  .084  .017 
( tig  and 7ih)  compact  -.025  .017 
intermediate  -.028  .017 
standard  -.023  .020 
luxary  -.019  .027 
foreign  .032  .014 